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Until the Client Speaks: Reviving the
Legal-Interest Model for Preverbal
Children
LISA KELLY* & ALICIA LEVEZU**
I. Introduction
When the state intervenes in a child's life through a child abuse and
neglect case, a court proceeding is initiated and a plethora of legal rights
attach. Children in these situations need trained legal representatives to
protect these rights. However, there is widespread confusion and debate
about the role of attorneys appointed to represent children. In many states,
these attorneys are expected to advocate for what they believe to be in
the child's best interests. However, this best-interest method of advocacy
has been widely criticized for allowing attorneys' implicit biases to
dominate legal proceedings, fostering a lack of accountability, allowing
inconsistency, assuming nonexistent expertise, serving state prosecutorial
functions, and violating the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
The legal rights of preverbal children must be protected without
falling prey to the drawbacks of the best-interest advocacy model. This
article explores the concept of legal-interest advocacy as an alternative
to best-interest representation for nonverbal clients, and it outlines how
legal-interest advocacy can address the major criticisms of best-interest
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representation while ensuring that children's legal rights are protected.
When a client is unable to direct the attorney's representation, the discretion
of the attorney must be constrained in order to allow the child's legal rights
to be fully respected. The legal-interest model envisions a lawyer who
is limited to enforcing legal rights that have been clearly articulated in
statutory and case law.
One alternative to the "best interests" approach is a substituted-
judgment model. This model is typically used with an adult client who has
become unable to direct representation. The attorney reviews the client's
past statements and conduct to determine what the client's goals would
be if they could be expressed. However, a newborn, infant, or even young
toddler has no prior life experience from which to draw conclusions about
preferences, and the advocate is left to imagine what he or she would want
if he or she were in this baby's booties. This model fails for many of the
same reasons that best-interest representation does. It is critical to find a
way to ensure that the legal rights of children are protected without falling
prey to the serious flaws of either the best-interest or substituted-judgment
model.
In 1974, Congress passed the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
(CAPTA), which mandated, among other things, that every child involved
in the child welfare system must be appointed an advocate to represent
his or her interests.' Over the last forty years, a growing number of states
have required this advocate to be an attorney.2 Meanwhile, the population
of children in the child welfare system has gotten younger.' In 2010,
when CAPTA was up for reauthorization, many advocates championed
amendments that would have required the child's representative to be an
attorney.4 With CAPTA overdue for reauthorization, the possibility of a
federal mandate requiring attorneys for children is again upon us.s
Now more than ever, the legal profession must critically consider the
appropriate role of legal counsel for very young, specifically preverbal,
1. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(ix) (2012).
2. FIRST STAR ET AL., A CHILD'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON LEGAL
REPRESENTATION FOR ABUSED & NEGLECTED CHILDREN (3d ed.), http://www.caichildlaw.org/
Misc/3rd EdChildsRighttoCounsel.pdf.
3. See, e.g., CHILDREN'S BUREAU, FOSTER CARE STATISTICS (2014) (the median age of a
child entering foster care in 2014 was 6.4 years old, which is a decrease from 7.7 years in 2005);
see also U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, CHILD
MALTREATMENT 2014, at 22 (2016) (in 2014, states reported that twenty-seven percent of child
abuse and neglect victims were under the age of three, with the highest rates of victimization
reported for children under age one).
4. See, e.g., Howard Davidson, The CAPTA Reauthorization Act of2010: What Advocates
Should Know, AM. BAR Ass'N (Jan. 3, 2011), https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/conmittees/
childrights/content/articles/0 103 11 -capta-reauthorization.html.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 5106h(a)(1) (2012) (authorizing appropriations for CAPTA through 2015).
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children. However, given the legal rights that all children in the complex
child welfare system have, it is not enough to critique the models of
representation in use. Attorneys who are serving an increasingly young
set of clients need a workable alternative that allows them to ethically and
effectively enforce the rights that babies have when they become subject
to the state's power.
This article seeks to revive and develop further the concept of legal-
interest advocacy, which was first introduced by the American Bar
Association in 1996. This overlooked model offers a workable alternative
to both the best-interest and substituted-judgment representation models
for preverbal clients. Through legal-interest advocacy, attorneys for
preverbal children are charged with ensuring that the many rights given
to infants are enforced, while withdrawing from attorneys the ability to
impose their values on the child client. This article outlines how legal-
interest advocacy representation can ensure that a child's legal rights are
protected and preserved until the child client can speak and direct his or
her own representation.
Part II of this article provides an overview of the historical debate
regarding the role of counsel for children and the limitations of that
debate in terms of addressing the appropriate role of counsel for preverbal
youth. Part III discusses the concept of legal-interest representation for
preverbal children as a limitation on an attorney's discretion, walking
through various hypothetical case scenarios to describe how legal-interest
advocacy can work in practice. Part IV addresses concerns about the legal-
interest model and concludes that, ultimately, legal-interest representation
is the most ethical way for attorneys to protect the rights of their preverbal
child clients without substituting their own values for those of a client in
need of legal protection and deserving of the right to mature into his or her
own autonomous agent.
II. The Current Paradigm for Representation of Young Children
For decades, attorneys and policy makers have struggled with providing
due process to children in the child welfare system, and especially those
taken from their families and placed with strangers.6 Children in these
6. Congress passed CAPTA in 1974, which required states to provide representatives (in
the form of a guardian ad litem, or GAL) to youth in child dependency proceedings to qualify
for state funding of child welfare systems. This statute came during a time of discussion among
attorneys about the need for legal representation for these children. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)
(2)(B)(ix) (2012); see also Hillary Rodham Clinton, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. EDUc.
R. 487, 509 (1973) ("[I]ndependent counsel for children should not be restricted to children
accused of delinquency, but should be required in any case where a child's interests are being
adjudicated.").
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situations are granted legal rights and are often appointed attorneys to
protect those rights. Starting in the 1960s, New York State began appointing
attorneys to act as "law guardians" for the children in the system.' The
role that an advocate was supposed to play in this setting was not clear,
and studies on the effectiveness of these advocates were troubling.' To
complicate matters, many children in the child welfare system are very
young and, due to their age or disability, are unable to express a position
and direct representation.9
Despite the inability to direct their representation, children caught in
the child welfare system possess legal rights and their lives are governed
by a legal system. Federal statutes and constitutional law grant affirmative
rights to these children: rights to services, to visits by caseworkers, and to
placement preferences that favor family. These are just a few of the rights
that a judge must protect in review hearings, which must be held at least
every six months."o Because the child welfare system operates through
this legal structure of courts, children need trained legal advocates to hold
the state and other parties accountable." The nature of our judicial system
relies upon licensed attorneys to enforce and protect our legal rights.12
That is no less true for the youngest of children who are at the center of
these proceedings and are the most unable to understand or advocate for
their own rights.
7. Merril Sobie, The Meaningful Representation of Children: An Analysis of the State Bar
Association Law Guardian Legislative Proposal, 64 N.Y. ST. B.J. 52, 52 (1992).
8. A 1984 study by the New York Bar Association discovered patterns of attorney behavior
that were "disturbing to say the least." Jane Knitzer & Merril Sobie, LAW GUARDIANS IN NEW
YoRu STATE: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN (N.Y. State Bar Ass'n,
1984). According to the study, lawyers were providing inadequate representation in almost one-
half of the cases and only providing effective representation in four percent of the cases. Id.
Additionally, nearly half of the transcripts of the studied cases contained appealable errors by
the law guardians or judges that went unchallenged. Id
9. U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 22.
10. For a noninclusive list of legal rights granted by federal statute to children in child abuse
and neglect proceedings, see App'x: Federal Legal Rights of Children in Dependencies, infra.
11. See, e.g., Brian G. Fraser, Independent Representation for the Abused and Neglected
Child: The Guardian Ad Litem, 13 CAL. W. L. REv. 16, 30 (1977) ("As juvenile courts become
more cognizant of children's rights, and as courts in general become more structured and
sensitive to due process safeguards, the lay person is at an increasing disadvantage. If the
purpose of an appointment is to protect the child's interests, then it would seem axiomatic that
such an appointment be made to one who understands the 'system' and how it can be used most
effectively for the child's interests.").
12. See, e.g., Katherine Hunt Federle, Lawyering in Juvenile Court: Lessons from a Civil
Gideon Experiment, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 93, 119 (2010) ("It is the lawyer for the child who
is in the best position to insist that the child's rights are respected, valued, and considered. 'The
American conception of justice is not simply encapsulated in the notion of Due Process, but is
encapsulated in a notion of Due Process defined in terms of adversarial presentation.' Because
the American legal system is adversarial, counsel fills an indispensable role in ensuring that
individual claimants are respected and that the requisites of due process are met." (quoting
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Due in part to the language of CAPTA, which required that each child be
appointed a guardian ad litem in his or her proceedings, the representation
of children by an attorney was largely understood, at least originally, as
akin to guardian ad litem representation.13 Guardians ad litem stand in for
the client, direct the litigation themselves, and represent the client's "best
interests," instead of allowing the client to self-direct the representation.14
In 1984, Professor Martin Guggenheim described the instruction that
many New York children's attorneys received as a simple and vague
command "to do just the right thing in every case."s "In essence, this
position merges the traditional roles of guardian ad litem and attorney.
The lawyer is expected to determine for him- or herself what is best for
the child and to then advocate that position in court."'" One key feature
of best-interest attorneys is the freedom to depart from the expressed
position and direction of their child clients and the ability to pursue an
alternative direction based on the attorney's own determination as to what
is ultimately best for the client.1 7
Over the past few decades, there has been a robust discussion and debate
about the appropriate role of counsel for these children: should attorneys act
as attorneys and follow their client's direction, or should attorneys serve as
"guardians" for these children, relying on their own determinations as to
what is best for the child to guide their advocacy?'I Throughout these years
of debate and discussion, best-interest representation has been critiqued in
the legal community as an improper model of attorney representation. A
common argument made against this model is that it assumes an attorney
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., After Legal Aid Is Abolished, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETues 375,
382 (1999))).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii) (2012).
14. Guardian ad litem, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (explaining that a
guardian ad litem is someone who is "appointed by the court to appear in a lawsuit on behalf of
an incompetent or minor party" and expected to represent the party's best interests and who can
be either an attorney or a nonattorney.)
15. Martin Guggenheim, The Right to Be Represented but Not Heard: Reflections on Legal
Representation for Children, 59 N.YU. L. REv. 76, 99 (1984).
16. Id New York has since revised its statutes to clarify that the attorney for the child is to
act as an attorney. See N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 241 (McKinney 2010).
17. See, e.g., Barbara Ann Atwood, The Uniform Representation of Children in Abuse,
Neglect, and Custody Proceedings Act: Bridging the Divide Between Pragmatism and Idealism,
42 FAM. L.Q. 63, 83 (2008) ("[T]he best interests attorney is not bound by the child's expressed
objectives but must consider those objectives and give them due weight according to the
underlying reasons and the child's developmental level.").
18. See, e.g., Annette Ruth Appell, Representing Children Representing What?: Critical
Reflections on Lawyering for Children, 39 COLuM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 573, 573 (2008); Emily
Buss, "You're My What?" The Problem of Children s Misperceptions of Their Lawyers'Roles,
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1734 (1996); Fraser, supra note 11, at 17; Suparna Malempati,
Beyond Paternalism: The Role of Counsel for Children in Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, 11
U.N.H. L. REV. 97, 114-15 (2013).
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is qualified to determine what is best for a child in a difficult situation.19
Attorneys are not formally trained or licensed experts in child welfare or
infant mental health, and so expecting the attorney to be able to discern the
best path forward for a particular child assumes an expertise the attorney
simply does not have. 2 0 Because attorneys do not have this expertise, it is
likely that they will instead rely on their "gut instinct," which all too often
is shaped by implicit bias. 2 1 By allowing the individual attorney to control
the direction of the representation, we allow the personal experiences and
subjectivity of that individual attorney to control the litigation.
Such domination by an individual attorney allows, in turn, for inconsistent
direction between one attorney and the next and a lack of transparency in
the decision-making process. Without a client who can hold an attorney
accountable, the attorney is allowed unfettered power to determine what
is best for each child client. This unfettered power ties the direction of the
litigation to the will of the particular attorney assigned to the case, leaving
families with no way to predict the course of representation. 22 Because this
19. See, e.g., Appell, supra note 18, at 634-35 ("The tenacity of this representation model
is surprising in light of children's attorneys' increasing willingness to acknowledge that they do
not know and are not trained to know what is best for children."); Buss, supra note 18, at 1746
("[Blest interests are, in fact, extremely hard to define, and no honest ... [guardian ad litem] can
deny that some of her best-interest judgments ultimately did not produce the best results for her
clients.").
20. See, e.g., Ann M. Haralambie, Humility and Child Autonomy in Child Welfare
and Custody Representation of Children, 28 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & Pot'Y 177, 195 (2006)
("[A]ttorneys do not have the expertise to know what is best for a given child in a given
circumstance."); Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed
Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505, 1525-26
(1996) ("[Best-interest representation] gives the lawyer the responsibility for an important job
for which he is neither trained nor qualified. Nothing in the traditional legal education qualifies
a lawyer to make determinations of a client's best interests.").
21. See, e.g., Appell, supra note 18, at 595 ("[A]ttorneys are unlikely to share the same
socio-economic background, cultural values, or kin as the children they represent; nor are they
likely to know the children better than the children's parents or the children themselves.");
Randi Mandelbaum, Revisiting the Question of Whether Young Children in Child Protection
Proceedings ShouldBe Represented by Lawyers, 32 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 34 (2000) ("[M]any have
expressed concern about legal representatives who represent a child's best interest, according to
what the attorney deems best (often and inevitably based upon the legal representative's values
and life experiences, albeit unwittingly at times) and the haphazard representation that ensues.");
Peters, supra note 20, at 1526 ("I believe that this level of discretion makes it inevitable that
the lawyer will sometimes resort to personal value choices, including references to his own
childhood, stereotypical views of clients whose backgrounds differ from his, and his own lay
understanding of child development and children's needs, in assessing a client's best interests.
Especially for practitioners who must take cases in high volume, the temptation to rely on gut
instinct, stereotype, or even bias is overwhelming.").
22. See, e.g., MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 95 (2005)
("The problem is compounded when we begin to believe there is something special about the
views her randomly assigned lawyer chose to take. Amazingly enough, courts sometimes believe
the position really is the child's, when it is nothing more than the lawyer's."); Mandelbaum,
supra note 21, at 36 ("Not only is there a significant chance that these decisions and ensuing
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system of attorney discretion also lacks transparency, families who suspect
the influence of biases on the representation have no way of addressing
those suspicions to hold the attorney accountable.23
Best-interest advocacy has also been critiqued for disrupting the
appropriate power balances, first, in a child's family, as the child's parent
is generally understood to be charged with determining what is best for
his or her own child,24 and second, in the courtroom, where the judicial
officer is charged with determining the child's best interest as the ultimate
question at issue. 25 Critics have also charged best-interest advocacy with
encouraging attorneys to act in overly protective ways and to advocate
regularly in favor of removing the child from his or her family, thereby
serving the prosecutorial interests of the state and acting as a second
attorney supporting the state's arguments.26 At least one study out of
Washington State provides some justification for this fear, noting that
volunteer best-interest advocates in Washington only disagreed with the
state's recommendations regarding parental visitation in six percent of
cases. 27
positions may be against the best interests of the individual child, who is likely of a different
race, ethnicity, and/or class than the legal representative, but it also leads to a system where the
position taken by a child's attorney may largely be based, not on what would be best for the
individual child with unique needs and values, but rather on the arbitrary chance of who was
appointed to represent the particular child."); Peters, supra note 20, at 1527 ("[T]he course of
a child's case may be changed forever because practitioner A, who believed X was in the child
client's best interests, was appointed to the case, instead of practitioner B, who believed Y was
in the child client's best interests.").
23. See, e.g., Appell, supra note 18, at 595 ("The attorney has relatively free reign to identify
and shape the child's interests and little accountability when acting within this attorney-client-
child relationship."); Martin Guggenheim, Review: Counseling Counselfor Children, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 1488, 1504 (1999) ("[I]t may be impossible for a judge ever to be sure whether the
lawyer's arguments or recommendations are actually the product of the lawyer's independent
views or merely reflect the preferences of the client.").
24. See, e.g., Appell, supra note 18, at 576 ("When attorneys represent children's interests,
the balance of this parent-child relationship is disrupted, with strangers assuming portions of the
parental role.").
25. The concerns that the best-interest advocate will decide ultimate issues of the case seem
grounded in reality. In one study of volunteer best-interest advocates, called Court Appointed
Special Advocates (CASAs), researchers found that "in more than four out of five cases, all
or almost all of the volunteers' recommendations were accepted [by the court]." CALIBER
AssoCIATES, EVALUATION OF CASA REPRESENTATION (2004); see also Malempati, supra note 18,
at 120 ("What is in the best interests of the child in a dependency case is a decision that lies with,
and should remain solely with, the juvenile court judge.").
26. See, e.g., Appell, supra note 18, at 591 ("Simply put, the child welfare bar is more
likely to welcome state intervention, viewing its clients as needing state custody, while the
juvenile justice bar views the state intervention and custody as detrimental and opposes state
intervention."); Martin Guggenheim, How Children 's Lawyers Serve State Interests, 6 NEv. L.J.
805, 821 (2006) (discussing a case out of New York State where an appellate court removed
the children's lawyer from the case after the lawyer supported returning the children to their
biological mother, a position opposed by the State).
27. K. Brennan et al., Washington State Court Appointed Special Advocate Program
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Finally, some have questioned whether or not an attorney can act as a
best-interest advocate within the scope of his or her ethical obligations as
an attomey.28 Attomeys are governed by rules of professional conduct that
require an attorney to maintain loyalty to his or her clients and ultimately
be directed by those clients. 29 The ability to supersede a client's stated
direction with the attorney's own direction is not outlined in an attorney's
ethical code.
After decades of robust debate on the issue, scholars now recognize the
validity of these critiques of best-interest representation and acknowledge
the need for an attorney to act as an attorney and take direction from his
or her client whenever possible.30 States are coming around to this view
as well and are changing their statutes, court rules, and practice standards
to clarify that client-directed attorneys should be appointed for all verbal
children.3 1
Evaluation Report, WASH. STATE CTR. FOR CT. RES. (2010) (CASAs are volunteer best-interest
advocates for children in Washington State).
28. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 18, at 1734 ("In shifting decision making from the child client
to herself, the lawyer has, in effect, changed clients: Her ultimate client loyalty is owed, not to
the child 'in the flesh,' but to the abstraction of the child's best interests."); Peters, supra note
20, at 122-23 ("Moreover, it is not even clear that Model Rule 1.14 allows the lawyer to take
on the full guardian ad litem role. Rule 1.14(b) authorizes a lawyer to 'seek appointment of a
guardian or take other protective action,' but it is unclear if that protective action could include
deciding the client's best interests and pursuing them as a goal of the representation. At least one
commentator has suggested that 'other protective action' is necessarily smaller than determining
the client's best interests and pursuing those lawyer-defined interests." (footnotes omitted)).
29. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983) ("[A] lawyer shall
abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule
1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued."); id. r. 1.7
("[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of
interest."); Id. r. 1.14 ("[W]hen a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in
connection with a representation is diminished... the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible,
maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.").
30. In 2006, child advocates gathered at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV) to
discuss the role of a child's attorney; this conference followed the 1996 Fordham Conference
on the same issue. The UNLV Conference resulted in a compilation of published articles on the
topic; the introduction to that compilation included the following sentiment: "During the nearly
half century that legal norms have mandated appointment of counsel or other representation for
children in legal proceedings, the children's attorneys' community has come to the conclusion
that ethical legal representation of children is synonymous with allowing the child to direct
representation." Recommendations of the UNLV Conference on Representing Children in
Families: Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years After Fordham, 6 NEV. L.J. 592, 592 (2006)
[hereinafter Fordham Recommendations].
31. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.163 (West 2013); CONN. R. SUPER. CT. Juv. § 32a-
1; LA. SUP. CT. R. XXXIII, pt. III, subpt. II, standard 4; N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 241 (McKinney
2010). Other states use less precise standards for appointment of stated-interest attorneys,
such as those declaring that the attorney should represent the child's stated interest once the
child is capable of "considered judgment." See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. Tit. 10a, § 1-4-306 (West
1969); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.004(a)(2) (2013); MASS. COMM. FOR PUB. COUNSEL SERVS.,
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN AND PARENTS IN CHILD
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However, by focusing on the distinction between client-directed and
best-interest lawyering, this debate has largely ignored the issue of how
attorneys should best represent children who are unable to direct them.3 2
Attorneys are trained to act as advisors, but ultimately they are to take
direction from their clients and to treat impaired clients as much like
unimpaired clients as possible.33 When clients are preverbal or nonverbal, it
is impossible for attorneys to advise their clients and take their direction.34
One alternative to best-interest advocacy for young children is a
"substituted judgment" model of representation. Substituted judgment
representation requires advocates to put themselves in the place of their
client, and in the context of their client's life, to make a decision that the
client likely would have made had they been able to verbalize a position.
This model is sometimes used in the medical field when patients are no
longer able to direct their care and is often used with elderly clients.
Professor Jean Koh Peters advocates for an approach to children's
representation that resembles substituted judgment, asking attorneys
to "individualize every representation, in a way that allows maximum
possible participation of the child client, so that the representation reflects
the child-in-context and the child's unique view of the world."36
WELFARE CASES 1.6(b) (2015); MD. FOSTER CARE CT. IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM, GUIDELINES FOR
ADVOCACY FOR ATTORNEYS REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CINA AND RELATED TPR AND ADOPTION
PROCEEDINGS, guideline A (2001).
32. See Donald N. Duquette, Two Distinct Roles/Bright Line Test, 6 NEv. L.J. 1240, 1246
(2006) ("[T]he unique challenge in representing the youngest children [is]-how to determine
the best interests of the child. This is among the least developed part of our jurisprudence and
should be a central focus of our discussion as a field.").
33. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2015) ("a lawyer shall
abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule
1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued"); id. r. 1.4
("A lawyer shall ... (2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's
objectives are to be accomplished; (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of
the matter"); id. r. 1.14 ("when a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in
connection with a representation is diminished ... the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible,
maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client"); id. r. 2.1 ("In representing a client,
a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.").
34. See, e.g., David R. Katner, Coming to Praise, Not to Bury the New ABA Standards of
Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 103, 103 (2000) ("State ethics codes were originally designed to regulate lawyers who
represent adults, clients capable of making their own decisions and communicating their wishes
to counsel. Applying these same codes to children's attorneys who represent clients ranging
from preverbal infants to older adolescents is at best problematic.").
35. See, e.g., Norman L. Cantor, The Bane ofSurrogate Decision-Making: Defining the
Best Interests of Never-Competent Persons, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 155, 157 (2005) ("Under a
substituted judgment formula, where a patient's religious values or philosophical preferences
can be determinative of post-competence care").
36. JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS:
ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS 1 (3d ed. 2007).
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However, a child client, unlike an adult or elderly client, has not yet had
the time to set a course for his or her life for the attorney to reflect upon
and follow; a child client has not yet expressed religious or philosophical
preferences for an attorney to use as a guide.37 Without this guide set by
the client, the substituted-judgment model meets the same criticisms as the
best-interest model. The substituted-judgment model continues to allow
the individual attorney to control the direction of the representation, which
allows for the domination of implicit biases, inconsistent advocacy, and a
lack of transparency.38 The model also continues to assume nonexistent
expertise because the attorney is to discern what a preverbal client would
want, acting as a form of "baby whisperer" to decipher the preverbal
client's direction. The substituted-judgment model continues to wrest
power from parents, who would normally be expected to interpret what
their nonverbal children want, and to place that power in the hands of
third-party strangers. Finally, like best-interest representation, there is no
provision in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct that allows for
substituted-judgment representation.
In the 1990s, the American Bar Association adopted Standards for
Attorney Representation that encouraged a third model of representation,
that of advancing only the child's "legal interests."39 The standards
supported the attorney acting as an attorney and following his or her
client's direction when the client was able to articulate a position.40 When
a client is preverbal, the attorney is instructed to advocate for the child's
legal interests and request a separate guardian ad litem.4 1 The Standards
explain:
37. See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 17, at 97 ("A lawyer's interpretation of what the child
would have wanted were the child able to express a position may mask arbitrary value judgements
more than would a transparent assessment of best interests."); Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm
for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children, 64 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1399, 1400 (1996)
("The crucial difference between most impaired adults, such as the elderly, and young children,
is that those adults have lived a full life, during which their personalities, values, and preferences
became knowable. Young children, in contrast, have not yet reached the point in life when their
values have been revealed. For this reason, the proposal that lawyers use 'substituted judgment'
when representing incompetent adults has little meaning when applied to young children.").
38. In fact, some have said that substituted judgment may fall into these traps even more
than a best-interest advocate. See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 17, at 97 ("A lawyer's interpretation
of what the child would have wanted were the child able to express a position may mask arbitrary
value judgements more than would a transparent assessment of best interests.").
39. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND
NEGLECT CASEs (AM BAR Ass'N 1996).
40. Id. at pt. I, Standard B-4. "The child's attorney should elicit the child's preferences
in a developmentally appropriate manner, advise the child, and provide guidance. The child's
attorney should represent the child's expressed preferences and follow the child's direction
throughout the course of litigation." Id.
41. Id. at pt. I, Standard B-4(l).
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The determination of the child's legal interests should be based on objective
criteria as set forth in the law that are related to the purposes of the proceedings.
The criteria should address the child's specific needs and preferences, the goal
of expeditious resolution of the case so the child can remain or return home or
be placed in a safe, nurturing, and permanent environment, and the use of the
least restrictive or detrimental alternatives available.42
This concept echoes language used by Professor Martin Guggenheim,
who suggested that attorneys for young children focus on a child's legal
rights: 43
For these reasons, when determining the role of counsel for children it is
essential to engage in a careful study of the legal rights and powers children
enjoy in the particular subject matter implicated by the proceeding. The role
of counsel for young children necessarily will vary across a variety of legal
matters. This is because the role of counsel is not developed in a vacuum.
What a lawyer for a young child must or may do will depend directly on the
rights of the young child in the particular matter involved. Because lawyers,
above all else, are the enforcers of their client's rights, the principal task
when determining counsel's role for young children is to examine the relevant
legislation and case law in the particular subject area. Once those rights have
been identified, the only remaining inquiry is to determine the most effective
way to enforce them."
In Guggenheim's discussion of this concept, he explores hypothetical
scenarios in the fields of education advocacy, reproductive rights, juvenile
justice, family custody disputes, and child welfare, without going into
great length on any one topic. 45
The ABA Standards seem at first glance to mirror the ideal promoted
by Professor Guggenheim: that of adhering to statutory and case law as
the guiding principle and moving away from individual determinations
regarding what is best. However, the Commentary following this Standard
appears to suggest a more subjective and individualized approach that
encourages attorneys to assess their child client's individual needs based
on the child's circumstances and development.46 By asking an attorney
42. Id. at pt. I, Standard B-5.
43. In Professor Guggenheim's assessment, this model should be used not only for preverbal
children but also for children who could be considered "impaired" due to age. Guggenheim,
supra note 37, at 1399-400.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND
NEGLECT CASES, supra note 39, cmt. to pt. I, Standard B-5 ("A child's legal interests may
include basic physical and emotional needs, such as safety, shelter, food, and clothing. Such
needs should be assessed in light of the child's vulnerability, dependence upon others, available
external resources, and the degree of risk. A child needs family affiliation and stability of
placement. The child's developmental level, including his or her sense of time, is relevant to an
assessment of need. For example, a very young child may be less able to tolerate separation from
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to assess a client's physical and emotional needs and balance competing
interests based on the preverbal child's needs, this standard starts to look
more like the substituted-judgment model previously discussed.
Around the time the ABA Standards were released, children's advocates
across the nation gathered for a conference at Fordham University to discuss
the role of an attorney for the child. Scholars referred to the "legal-interest"
standard in the resulting published Recommendations of the Conference.47
These recommendations, however, refer to a seven-step process for
determining a child's legal interest that allowed for great discretion by
the attorney and again seemed more to mirror a substituted-judgment
ideology, asking attorneys to focus on the child in context, examine how
the child is behaving, refer to nonlegal disciplines, and rely on experts. 48
The varying interpretations of the term "legal-interest advocacy," as
discussed by Professor Guggenheim, the drafters of the ABA Standards,
and the Fordham Conference attendees, creates confusion about what this
style of representation should look like in reality. Unfortunately, after the
Fordham Conference, there was very little written about the legal-interest
standard that might help develop the concept more robustly.
Adding to this confusion, soon after the ABA published its standards,
the National Association of Counsel for Children (NACC) released its
own standards for representation, which differed from the ABA Standards
and allowed for greater use of best-interest representation. 4 9 In 2011, the
ABA adopted a Model Act Governing the Representation of Children in
Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings.so The Model Act makes no
reference to a legal-interest determination and instead explicitly instructs
a primary caretaker than an older child, and if separation is necessary, more frequent visitation
than is ordinarily provided may be necessary. In general, a child prefers to live with known
people, to continue normal activities, and to avoid moving. To that end, the child's attorney
should determine whether relatives, friends, neighbors, or other people known to the child are
appropriate and available as placement resources. The lawyer must determine the child's feelings
about the proposed caretaker, however, because familiarity does not automatically confer
positive regard. Further, the lawyer may need to balance competing stability interests, such as
living with a relative in another town versus living in a foster home in the same neighborhood.
The individual child's needs will influence this balancing task.").
47. Fordham Recommendations, supra note 30, at 1311.
48. Id.
49. NAT'LAss'N OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, NACC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REPRESENTATION
OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES 14-15 (2001) ("The distinction between the ABA
Standards and the NACC Revised ABA Standards is that where the ABA remained consistent
with the client directed attorney throughout, the NACC carved out a significant exception where
the client cannot meaningfully participate in the formulation of his or her position. In such cases,
the NACC's version calls for a GAL type judgment using objective criteria.").
50. See MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE, NEGLECT,
AND DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS (AM. BAR Ass'N 2011), https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/
committees/childrights/docs/abamodelact 2011.pdf.
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attorneys to make a substituted-judgment determination when their child
clients are preverbal."
Unsurprisingly, there continues to be much confusion among attorneys
regarding the appropriate approach to the representation of preverbal
children.52 While scholars and statutes sometimes refer to legal-interest
representation, this concept has not been fully explored or significantly
discussed since the 1990s. In this vacuum, we have created an unpredictable
system of representation for our preverbal child clients and allowed the
best-interest model to flourish despite its many flaws.53 Children deserve
better.
III. Reviving the Legal-Interest Model
The child welfare system needs a thoughtful alternative to client-
directed advocacy for preverbal and nonverbal child clients. Scholarship
and practitioners have largely agreed that when possible, client-directed
advocacy is the ideal role for an attorney;54 however, we know that
children are sometimes too young to communicate verbally. To avoid the
many pitfalls of the best-interest and substituted-judgment models and
remain committed to protecting the rights of children, child advocates
should reexamine the concept of legal-interest representation for preverbal
51. Id at § 7(d). ("During a temporary period or on a particular issue where a normal client-
lawyer relationship is not reasonably possible to maintain, the child's lawyer shall make a
substituted judgment determination. A substituted judgment determination includes determining
what the child would decide if he or she were capable of making an adequately considered
decision, and representing the child in accordance with that determination.").
52. See, e.g., Duquette, supra note 32, at 1246 "[T]he unique challenge in representing the
youngest children [is]-how to determine the best interests of the child. This is among the least
developed part of our jurisprudence and should be a central focus of our discussion as a field."
); Katner, supra note 34, at 107 ("Attorneys may be unable to resolve the confusion about their
roles given some of the limitations present in juvenile dependency court proceedings."); Kasey
L. Wassenaar, Defenseless Children: Achieving Competent Representation for Children in Abuse
and Neglect Proceedings Through Statutory Reform in South Dakota, 56 S.D. L. REv. 182, 182
(2011) ("The lack of guidance is causing confusion and frustration for attorneys working in this
unique field of law, which ultimately reduces the quality of representation.").
53. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1614(1) (West 1976) ("In any proceeding under this
chapter for a child under the age of twelve (12) years, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem
for the child. . . ."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-10(B)-(F) (West 2005) ("(c) At the inception of
an abuse and neglect proceeding, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for a child under
fourteen years of age .... The court shall assure that the child's guardian ad litem zealously
represents the child's best interest . . . ."). This approach of best interest representation as a
default for young children is also championed by Professor Duquette. See Duquette, supra note
32, at 1240 ("A better approach towards recognizing and accommodating the child's developing
cognitive abilities and judgment would be to adopt a bright line age test, say at seven. At age
seven (or eight or ten) and above the youth would receive a client directed advocate, that is,
a child's attorney, and below the bright-line age a child gets a best interests (or substituted
judgment) advocate.").
54. See supra note 30.
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children. The legal-interest model can serve as an alternative in those
instances where a child is unable to state his or her interest.
A legal-interest attorney would be charged, not with telling the court
what the advocate thinks is best or what the advocate imagines the child
would want, but with identifying the legal rights that are implicated in
a given situation and advocating solely for the protection of those legal
rights." This role highlights the unique skill set of lawyers-that of
identifying legal issues and utilizing court processes-while moving away
from roles that rely on the social work and child development skills that do
not fall within a lawyer's specific expertise. By replacing the best-interest
model with a legal-interest model for preverbal and nonverbal children,
we can protect the legal rights of the child while limiting the discretion
of the otherwise unchecked advocate and increasing transparency in the
system.
After a review of the dilemmas inherent in representing preverbal
clients, one may be tempted to assume that the best approach is to remove
the lawyer from the equation altogether. However, this approach ignores
the legal rights that are explicitly granted by statutes to even the youngest
children once the state intervenes into a family and wrests control from
the child's caregiver.56 Take, for example, the child's statutory right to
be placed with relatives, assuming relatives are available and safe.5 7 If
the child's parent has fallen out of touch or is in a dispute with relatives,
the parent may not suggest the relative as a possible placement resource.
55. As discussed in Part II, supra, a similar approach has previously been suggested by
Professor Guggenheim as a model to constrain the actions of child advocates for young clients,
not just those clients who are pre- and nonverbal. See Guggenheim, supra note 37, at 1399.
56. See, e.g., Duquette, supra note 32, at 1246 ("Perhaps children below the bright line age
cut-off, who cannot instruct counsel, should not have lawyers at all as Professor Guggenheim
has argued. The better view is that children indeed need advocates in this complex and often-
chaotic process. Children caught up in any complex, even well meaning, bureaucracy, such as
a hospital, school, or the court process, still need someone with power to look out for them.
Parents, ordinarily the first choice, cannot be depended on in child welfare cases because the
parents' ability to care for the child is the very issue before the court."); Federle, supra note 12,
at 119 ("It is not enough to suggest that because children are incompetent, or otherwise disabled,
they lack rights-for it is very clear that children do have rights: constitutional, statutory,
procedural, and substantive. Moreover, it is the lawyer for the child who is in the best position
to insist that the child's rights are respected, valued, and considered. 'The American conception
of justice is not simply encapsulated in the notion of Due Process, but is encapsulated in a
notion of Due Process defined in terms of adversarial presentation.' Because the American legal
system is adversarial, counsel fills an indispensable role in ensuring that individual claimants
are respected and that the requisites of due process are met."); Marvin Ventrell, From Cause
to Profession: The Development of Children s Law and Practice, COLO. LAW. 65, 65 ("mhe
experience of over a century has taught that children deserve more than sympathy; they also
deserve fair processes that respect their autonomy as individuals, family members, and rights-
based citizens.").
57. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(19), (31) (2012).
Until the Client Speaks: Reviving the Legal-Interest Model for Preverbal Children 397
Nevertheless, the child has the legal right to be placed with family.
Without an attorney for the child, there is no mechanism to hold the state
accountable for this obligation to the child.
Because the ABA originally proposed the legal-interest model for
representation of preverbal children in the 1996 Standards," some states
have incorporated the term "legal interest" into their state standards for
child representation.5 9 However, in part because this role has not been
discussed at length since the 1990s, there continues to be confusion as to
how the concept of legal interests should be applied.60
As noted in Part II, the drafters of the ABA Standards proposed the
following guidance for determining a child's legal interests.
The determination of the child's legal interests should be based on objective
criteria as set forth in the laws that are related to the purposes of the proceedings.
The criteria should address the child's specific needs and preferences, the goal
of expeditious resolution of the case so the child can remain or return home or
be placed in a safe, nurturing, and permanent environment, and the use of the
least restrictive or detrimental alternatives available. 61
This definition could be interpreted to give wide discretion to the
child's attorney in evaluating the child's needs and preferences, but such
an evaluation is not one that an attorney is trained to make when the
child is preverbal. 62 However, if one focuses upon the guidance's primary
exhortation, which is to rely upon the objective criteria embodied in the
statutes that are related to the proceedings, it is possible to reconcile the
58. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND
NEGLECT CASES, supra note 39.
59. See, e.g., Florida Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse
and Neglect Cases, FLA. B. STANDING COMM. ON THE LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILD., Standard B-4
cmt. 2 (Jan. 18, 2006), http://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Florida-Guidelines-for-
Attorneys-who-Represent-Children-in-Delinquency-Proceedings.pdf; Statewide Children's
Representation Workgroup, Meaningful Legal Representation for Children and Youth in
Washington's Child Welfare System, WASH. CTS. 1.1(7) (2010).
60. See, e.g., Annette R. Appell, Decontextualizing the Child Client: The Efficacy of the
Attorney-Client Model for Very Young Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1955, 1957 (1996)
("However, the [ABA & Fordham] guidelines do not provide sufficient direction for the
representation of very young clients-newborns to toddlers-who may be nonverbal and lack
both the developmental capacity to make reasoned decisions and a history of sufficient duration
or depth to provide context and guidance to the attorney.").
61. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND
NEGLECT CASES, supra note 39, at pt. I, Standard B-5.
62. See, e.g., Duquette, supra note 32, at 1242-43 ("[T]he ABA Standards, the NACC
modification of these standards and the Fordham Conference Recommendations all contain
within themselves opportunity for lawyer discretion about what position to take on behalf of
the child that is unreviewed by anyone else, not guided by principled criteria, and potentially
idiosyncratic . . . so that similarly situated children run a considerable risk of receiving different
forms of advocacy and different levels of participation in the decision-making depending upon
the personality and values of the lawyer assigned to the case.").
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subsequent mention of a child's needs and preferences. Rather than reading
this second sentence as an undoing of the legal-interest model, it makes
more sense to read it as an understanding that, in general, the relevant
statutes should address the child's needs and preferences, as well as the
goals of expeditious resolution of the case in the context of child safety,
permanency, and normalcy.6 3 Therefore, where clients cannot express their
preferences and needs, in order to be truly transparent and accountable,
legal-interest attorneys must think of the law as their master, instead of
their client.
This conception of legal-interest advocacy as tying an attorney to the
explicit wording of statutes and case law that set out affirmative legal rights
for his or her child client allows for the attorney to protect the client's legal
rights while ensuring an appropriate sense of humility in the attorney and
constraining the attorney's power to areas in which he or she is trained.
The ability to review a set of circumstances and identify the legal issues
involved is one of the core skills an attorney possesses.' This technique of
legal-issue spotting is unique to the profession of lawyers and is necessary
to ensure that an individual's legal rights are protected. The legal-interest
model draws upon these legal skills instead of encouraging lawyers to
act outside of their professional training. In child welfare situations,
attorneys often get thrown into the middle of complex family dynamics,
cycles of poverty and abuse, and allegations of harm to children. In these
challenging situations, reasonable minds may disagree about the best path
forward. The legal-interest model ensures that someone will parse through
the complexity to identify the explicitly enumerated legal rights at stake
and utilize the court systems to ensure that those legal rights are protected
when necessary.
The obvious first step of any attorney in this role is to gain a
comprehensive knowledge of the federal and state laws that regulate
the child welfare system. To properly issue spot, attorneys must have
a comprehensive knowledge of the many legal rights at stake for their
preverbal and nonverbal clients. The authors of this article have compiled
a list of federal legal rights within the child welfare realm that would be
applicable to very young preverbal children.65 This initial list is nearly four
pages long and is limited to rights that would be applicable to a preverbal
child; it does not include the legal rights that would be applicable to older
63. STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND
NEGLECT CASES, supra note 39, at pt. I, Standard B-5.
64. See, e.g., Kristina V. Foehrkolb & Marc A. DeSimone Jr., Debunking the Myths
Surrounding Student Scholarly Writing, 74 MD. L. REv. 169, 173 (2014) ("The diagnostic ability
to 'issue spot' is perhaps the greatest skill a practicing attorney can possess ....
65. See infra Appendix: Federal Legal Rights of Children in Dependencies.
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youth and teens, rights such as those related to education and the transition
to adulthood. Included in this list is the right to regular visits by a social
worker,6 6 coordinated health care that includes regular screenings, 67 and
notification of adult relatives within thirty days of removal, 8 to name a
few. The list of legal rights granted to the child is even greater if the child
falls under the ambit of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).6 9 While
state statutes are often modeled on the federal law and states are required
to implement federal laws to receive funding, many state statutes have
language that varies slightly and/or expands the list of legal rights for
young children. Any attorney advocating under the legal-interest model
for a young child will need to begin by compiling a list of the legal rights
explicitly granted in his or her state of practice.
Finally, for legal-interest advocacy to be most effective, an attorney
must take a proactive approach to representation and not wait for conflicts
to arise. By ensuring that the state is meeting its obligations, timelines
are adhered to, and court orders are followed throughout the course of a
case, the legal-interest attorney can avoid many frustrating situations that
create conflicts between legal rights.70 A legal-interest attorney may need
to retain experts who can act as witnesses in hearings about the child to
flesh out the child's circumstances. Experts may be important in situations
where another party is seeking to restrict a child's legal rights or in high-
conflict situations.
To conceptualize the practical application of this legal-interest model,
compare and contrast how best-interest and legal-interest attorneys7 1
would react to the hypothetical cases of Sasha and Blake.
A. Sasha
Sasha is a one-month-old with special medical needs who just entered
foster care last week after being discharged from the neonatal intensive
66. 42 U.S.C. § 624(f)(1)(A) (2012).
67. Id. § 671(a)(30).
68. Id. § 671(a)(29).
69. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a)-(f) (2012).
70. See, e.g., Merril Sobie, The Child Client: Representing Children in Child Protective
Proceedings, 22 TOURO L. REv. 745, 819 (2006) ("For some issues, and in some cases, the task
may be relatively easy. If the child needs specialized services, such as medical care, counsel's
position concerning that topic should be clear. If the young child has been abandoned or seriously
abused and an acceptable kinship arrangement is possible, the lawyer's strategy is obvious.").
To be clear, the legal-interest attorney would have the responsibility to enforce court orders that
protect the legal rights of the child, but also an obligation to appeal those that do not.
71. Federal law is used in order to demonstrate the universal applicability of this model.
Obviously, a legal-interest attorney would need to apply the statutes specific to his or her local
jurisdiction and not rely solely on federal law.
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care unit. Sasha is placed with nonrelative foster-to-adopt parents. Sasha's
biological parents are considering relinquishing their parental rights but
have not yet done so. Sasha's attorney has visited Sasha at her placement,
and her foster parents are excited to adopt Sasha; they have set up a
nursery for her and are caring for her well, and there are no apparent safety
concerns. Sasha's attorney has just been notified by the social worker that
the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) has identified a
relative in a neighboring community that is able to take Sasha; that relative,
however, has limited resources and is not sure about the possibility of
adoption at this point.
1. BEST-INTEREST REPRESENTATION
Assuming the best-interest advocate had the time to do so,72 she might
visit Sasha in her current placement and talk to her biological parents about
the possibility of relinquishment. Based on her assessment, that attorney
might advocate for keeping Sasha where she is, considering the ability of
the foster parents to care for Sasha and the biological parents' indication
that they may wish to relinquish their rights.
2. LEGAL-INTEREST REPRESENTATION
The legal-interest attorney would not have the same discretion as the
best-interest attorney and would instead need to rely solely on the specific
rights outlined in the statute. Sasha's legal interests would arise out of
statutory requirements for:
* reasonable efforts to reunify the child and her biological parents;73
* placement in a safe home, with background checks completed on
placements;7 4 and
* preference for placements with relatives.75
72. Judges frequently rely upon best-interest advocates to investigate the circumstances of
a child's placement as well as alternative placements with families and relatives. In a national
survey of 550 dependency judges, judges frequently cited the information-gathering role of
the best-interest advocate as critical. Hon. J. Dean Lewis, The Role and Responsibilities of the
CASA/GAL Volunteer: What Do Judges Think?, NAT'L CT. APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOCATES
(2009), http://www.casaforchildren.org/site/c.mtJSJ7MPIsE/b.5926225/k.6569/WhatDo
JudgesThink.htm. Nonetheless, time constraints and caseloads may impact how well the
individual advocate is able to fulfill this responsibility. See supra notes 8-9.
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2012).
74. See id. §§ 671(a)(10)(A), 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xxii).
75. See id. § 671(a)(19) (2012). Title 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(19) (2015) encourages, but does
not require, states to adopt a preference for relative caregivers ("[T]he State shall consider giving
preference to an adult relative over a non-related caregiver when determining a placement for
a child, provided that the relative caregiver meets all relevant State child protection standard").
This example assumes a state's adoption of this preference.
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Sasha has a legal right to be placed with relatives, if possible, to
maintain family ties. She does not have a legal right to the most well-
resourced home. Although adoption is often the preferred outcome of
some state officials, Sasha's legal right to reunify with her parents would
be safeguarded. Moreover, she does not have a right to the preference
of one alternate permanent plan (such as adoption) over another (such as
guardianship with the relatives).
A legal-interest attorney would advocate for a speedy investigation of
the relative to ensure that he or she can provide a safe home. Assuming
that the relative passes background checks, the attorney should advocate
for that placement as soon as possible. The relative's lack of commitment
to adoption supports the appropriateness of this placement, as the child
does not have a statutory right to adoption, but she does have a statutory
right to reunification, and the latter is preserved.
B. Blake
Blake is a preverbal, developmentally delayed, two-and-a-half-year-
old who was recently placed into foster care after being removed from
his parents for chronic neglect. His parents have provided the names of
maternal and paternal grandparents and one aunt out-of-state but have
repeatedly told DSHS that no one in the family is in a position to take
Blake, and, further, that "they are not good people." The parents report
that Blake's last doctor's appointment was a year ago and that he has no
diagnoses of mental health or developmental disabilities. However, his
new foster parents report that he wakes up screaming several times during
the night.
1. BEST-INTEREST REPRESENTATION
Assuming the best-interest advocate had time, she might visit Blake
in his foster home and assess the quality of care he is receiving. A best-
interest advocate might also urge Blake's foster parents to take him to the
doctor for a check-up as soon as possible and follow up with the social
worker to ensure that Blake gets a full screening. If the best-interest
advocate believes Blake is getting proper care by the foster parents, she
will likely recommend that Blake stay in their home. She may or may not
assert Blake's right to have his relatives considered a placement resource
if she wants Blake to remain in his current foster home. The best-interest
advocate's position could also vary based on the value that advocate places
on connections to relatives and respect for parental placement preferences.
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2. LEGAL-INTEREST REPRESENTATION
The statutes in this situation explicitly give Blake legal rights to:
* referral to early intervention services under the Individual with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) once abuse or neglect is
substantiated;7 6
* coordinated health care that includes regular screenings, oversight
of prescriptions, continuity of health care, and treatment of trauma
associated with removal; 7 7
* notification of removal, and process for involvement and placement
to all adult relatives, including grandparents, within thirty days of
removal; and78
* preference for relative placements. 7 9
The legal-interest attorney would be required, therefore, to press the
state to identify, investigate, and consider all relatives for placement.
The legal-interest attorney's additional priorities would include ensuring
that the social worker is prepared to submit an IDEA referral as soon as
allegations of neglect are substantiated and that, in addition to a doctor
visit, an infant mental health screening be conducted as soon as possible.
Due to the chaos of the many moving pieces early in a case, it is the legal-
interest advocate's responsibility to ensure these issues are not lost in the
fray and to bring a motion for a court order if these issues are not addressed
in a timely manner. Both a best-interest and a legal-interest advocate would
likely fight for the same access to resources for their clients; however,
because the legal-interest advocate's focus is solely on Blake's legal rights
and is not burdened by the added weight of trying to assess what is best,
he or she may be better able to formulate legal solutions. Such solutions
might include, for example, bringing a motion for enforcement to hold
state actors accountable to Blake on timelines that meet Blake's needs.
In the child welfare arena, statutes lay out specific rights for children
and families. Occasionally, statutes grant legal rights that are unclear
or undefined-especially those that incorporate the "best interests"
standard into the explicit wording of the statute. A statute that states,
for example, that a child has a right to be placed "in close proximity to
the parents' home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of
the child"so does not help a court to ascertain what those best interests
might be. Additionally, statutes occasionally prescribe a standard that is
vague or open to interpretation; an example would be a statute requiring
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xxi) (2012).
77. See id. § 622(b)(15).
78. See id. § 671(a)(29).
79. See id. § 671(a)(19). See supra note 72.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(A) (2012).
Until the Client Speaks: Reviving the Legal-Interest Model for Preverbal Children 403
"reasonable" efforts to reunify a family."
When approaching unclear or undefined rights, legal-interest advocates
cannot use their discretion to pursue any definition or clarity they think
would be best. In those situations, the legal-interest attorney must refrain
from substituting his or her own judgment about what the client should
want or how these rights should be defined. Whenever there is room for
interpretation, the legal-interest attorney, like any attorney, must look to
case law for guidance on the definition and scope of the legal right.
Assuming case law is not helpful or is nonexistent, legal-interest
attorneys must not interpret vague terms to suit their desired outcomes.
Instead, any interpretation by a legal-interest advocate of qualifying
adjectives within a statute must favor the protection of the underlying
purpose of that statute. Statutes are written with the goal or purpose of
protecting or promoting some principle. Often, they are imbedded with
terms such as "unless it is not in the child's best interest" in order to give
judicial officers discretion to adapt these principles to the facts of the case.
However, when legal-interest attorneys are interpreting these statutes, they
should not focus on the exception to the rule, but on the rule itself--on
what the goal or purpose of that statute is, on why it was written in the first
place. Consider the application of this principle in Jamie and Michael's
hypothetical cases.
C. Jamie
Jamie is a one-year-old girl who was just removed from her drug-
addicted parents due to chronic neglect. The state has located two suitable
relatives for Jamie to be placed with: her matemal aunt, Kendra, and her
paternal uncle, Richard. The state would like to place Jamie with Richard,
who lives on the other side of the state about three hours away. Richard is
married and has two children of his own, ages four and seven. His family
lives in a large house in a nice neighborhood, and there is an extra bedroom
for Jamie. Kendra, on the other hand, is a single woman who lives in a
small duplex, which also has an extra bedroom. The duplex is less than
five minutes away from Jamie's mother's home. Both Kendra and Richard
have passed background checks and are willing to take Jamie for as long
as necessary until Jamie's parents are able to get clean and sober.
1. BEST-INTEREST REPRESENTATION
Time permitting, a best-interest advocate would likely attempt to visit
both homes and talk with both potential caregivers. Based on Richard's
resources, his experience in parenting, and the additional childcare help of
81. See, e.g., id. § 671(a)(31)(A)-(B).
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Richard's wife, it is very possible that the best-interest advocate will agree
with the state to promote placement with Richard. However, it is difficult
to make assumptions about the course of action any particular best-interest
advocate will take with any given set of circumstances because, as the
critics point out, much depends on the individual best-interest advocate's
values and implicit biases.
2. LEGAL-INTEREST REPRESENTATION
The applicable statutes give Jamie legal rights to:
* notification to all adult relatives, including grandparents, ofher removal
and of the process for becoming involved and taking placement of the
child, within thirty days of removal;8 2
* reasonable efforts to reunify the child and her biological parents;83
* placement in a safe home, with background checks completed on
potential placements;'
* the least restrictive placement available and one in close proximity to
a parent's home, consistent with the best interests and special needs
of the child."
Here, Jamie's legal right to be placed in close proximity to her parents'
home is qualified by a statement regarding Jamie's best interests. If the
legal-interest attorney were authorized to interpret Jamie's best interests
however he or she sees fit, then the legal-interest attorney would function
identically to the best-interest advocate. However, the legal-interest
attorney is limited to interpretations of qualifying adjectives (i.e. "best"
interests, "reasonable" efforts) that are the most favorable to the legal right
being explicitly granted. In this instance, Jamie has an underlying legal
right to be placed in close proximity to her parents' home. Therefore, the
legal-interest attorney must interpret what is in Jamie's best interest in the
light most favorable to the asserted right to be close to her parent's home.
Kendra's home may not be the most well-resourced and Kendra might
not be the most.experienced parent, but Jamie is not given a legal right to
either of those things. Instead, Jamie has a legal right to be placed in close
proximity to her parents' house. Therefore, the legal-interest advocate
should challenge the state and encourage placement with Kendra, possibly
through bringing a motion in court.
82. See id. § 671(a)(29).
83. See id. §671(a)(15).
84. See id. §§ 671(a)(10)(A), 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xxii).
85. See id. § 675(5).
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D. Michael
The state removed Michael at birth due to his mother's substance abuse
issues. Michael was first placed with his maternal aunt. However, that
placement was disrupted after six months when the aunt had to move out
of state for work. Michael then spent five months with his grandmother,
but this placement was disrupted as well after the grandmother was
hospitalized. Michael is now in licensed foster care and has been in out-
of-home placement for fifteen months. His current foster parents are not
licensed to adopt.
The DSHS offered inpatient treatment for the mother's substance
abuse. She participated and succeeded in the inpatient program. However,
since discharge, she has had some relapses. Her relapses occur with less
frequency and seem to be in a pattern moving toward extinguishment.
Nevertheless, the mother relapsed three weeks ago. The mother has
attended most visits, and supervisors note that she has been appropriate in
her caregiving, but she has missed visits due to her relapse. A permanency
planning hearing is scheduled in a month. The state has argued that the
mother's overall progress in treatment is compelling evidence that the
child's best interests would be served by allowing her another six months
to succeed completely in treatment.
1. BEST-INTEREST REPRESENTATION
The best-interest advocate would be influenced by his or her personal
values, sense of what the mother's chances are for ultimate success,
and sense of the nature of the child's relationship with the mother. The
best-interest advocate might choose to support the state's argument for
the best-interest exception to the termination of parental rights (TPR)
filing requirement. In the alternative, the best-interest advocate might
choose to recommend the filing of TPR so that the child can move toward
permanency.
2. LEGAL-INTEREST REPRESENTATION
Michael's relevant statutory rights in this situation include the right to:
be transitioned to adoption (through filing a TPR petition and
identifying, recruiting, processing, and approving a qualified family
for adoption) if he has been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent
twenty-two months 86 -Unless he is placed in a relative's care, the state
agency has documented a compelling reason that adoption is not in his
best interest, or reasonable efforts to reunify the family have not been
made by the state in accordance with the case plan;
86. See id. § 675(5)(E).
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* be placed in a home or facility that meets state standards for sanitation,
safety, and protection of civil rights;"
* have a permanency planning hearing, no less frequently than every
twelve months after "entering foster care," to ensure he has a
permanent plan of reunification, adoption, or legal guardianship, and
to have a timeline for achieving that plan;"
* receive placement, in a manner that is timely and consistent with the
primary plan, and completion of steps necessary to finalize that plan.8 9
For Michael, the statutory period for reunification efforts has passed,
and it appears that the only possible exception to the filing requirement
that applies is the best-interest exception. The burden of proving the
compelling reason that supports the best-interest exception is on the state.
The best-interest argument is the state's to make, and the legal-interest
attorney may not take a position on that question. While there is room
for the legal-interest attorney to make sure that the state has fulfilled its
duty to consider the best-interest exception before going forward with
termination, the legal-interest attorney should make clear that Michael's
primary legal interest, as outlined in the statute, is now in permanency
with a focus on adoption.
If the state does not succeed in carrying its burden of proof regarding
the best-interest exception, the legal-interest attorney should fully explore
the current foster parents' interest in adoption and ability to adopt. If the
current foster placement family is truly unable or unwilling, the legal-
interest attorney should be prepared to press for a placement with new
foster parents who are licensed and interested in adoption.
Just as the statutory rights ofchildren are sometimes unclear or undefined,
the constitutional rights of children may also be unclear or undefined.90
When approaching constitutional rights that are undefined or otherwise
unclear under case law, legal-interest advocates cannot use their discretion
to pursue any definition or clarity they think best. While statutory rights
can be guided by the purpose of the statute, constitutional rights are not
87. See id. § 671(a)(10)(A).
88. See id. § 675(5)(C).
89. See id. § 671(a)(15)(C).
90. Scholars have previously noted this lack of clarity as a significant challenge of legal-
interest advocacy. See, e.g., Donald N. Duquette, Legal Representation for Children in Protection
Proceedings: Two District Lawyer Roles Are Required, 34 FAM. L.Q. 441, 454 (2000) ("[T]
he legal interests of a child may be unclear because courts do not always apply constitutional
doctrine consistently as applied to children's rights, while arguable constitutional protections
may also be inconsistent with existing statutory or other substantive law."); Mandelbaum, supra
note 21, at 48-49 ("[I]t will be difficult to identify the relevant legal interests. These interests are
not always clear and may even be subject to multiple and conflicting interpretations.").
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thus bound.9 1 Case law is the primary vehicle that defines the contours of
constitutional rights. The legal-interest lawyer should determine whether
the case law exists and whether it is sufficiently specific and clear so as
to grant rights to a child within his or her fact-specific situation. While
attorneys who represent verbal children can and should continue to
advocate on their client's behalf to define and expand the constitutional
rights of their clients, legal-interest attorneys do not have such authority.
Because a legal-interest attorney is not able to choose the direction of
the litigation, the legal-interest attorney should consider undefined and
vaguely worded constitutional legal rights to be outside the scope of his or
her representation. This will be a frustrating limitation to many advocates.
However, attorneys for verbal children will not be so limited, and they
are encouraged to advocate for their clients' constitutional rights; this
advocacy may result in case law that will better clarify the legal rights of
all dependent children, allowing legal-interest attorneys to act based on
clear precedent once it is established.
Another challenge for legal-interest attorneys is the issue of conflicting
legal rights. Unfortunately, sometimes one legal right conflicts with
another. Critics of the legal-interest model have pointed to the conflicts
between vague constitutional rights as a reason to allow for greater attorney
discretion.92 The legal-interest model, as described in this article, avoids
many of these conflicts between vague constitutional rights by insisting on
a focus on clearly and explicitly delineated rights. However, it is inevitable
that occasionally even clearly defined statutory rights will conflict. In this
situation, the legal-interest attorney is left without a clear path forward.
When examining conflicting legal rights, the legal-interest attorney
must first determine if there is a true conflict-if the exercise of one right
necessarily prevents the exercise of another. For example, one might be
91. The variety of constitutional interpretation methods a judge may invoke in deciding a
constitutional claim underscores the inability of an attorney to confidently assert the primary
underlying principle for interpreting a constitutional right. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Legal
Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1331, 1334-35 (1988); Stephen M.
Feldman, Constitutional Interpretation and History: New Originalism or Eclecticism?, 28 BYU
J. PuB. L. 283, 287 (2014); Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72
TEX. L. REv. 1753, 1757 (1994).
92. See, e.g., Duquette, supra note 90, at 448-49 ("[F]ocusing on the so-called 'legal
interests' is very unsatisfactory. The child has a variety of legal interests, many of which are
inconsistent with one another. For example, a child has a legal interest in being free from
physical and mental harm, but is that interest served by continuing to separate the child from
a parent who injured the child in the past, or by seeking a quick reunification of the child with
the parent to whom he or she is attached under terms and conditions calculated to make the
home safe?"); id. at 454 ("[T]he legal interests of a child may be unclear because courts do not
always apply constitutional doctrine consistently as applied to children's rights, while arguable
constitutional protections may also be inconsistent with existing statutory or other substantive
law. Even the clearly defined legal interests of the child may conflict.").
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tempted to see a situation where placement with a sibling or adult relative
may conflict with the child's right to reunification as a conflict between
legal rights.93 However, a legal-interest attorney must first determine if
placement with a relative actually jeopardizes reunification. If the relative
lives far away, there may be a true conflict. However, if the issue is that the
relative and the parents are not on good terms, assuming that the baby and
parents continue to have ample access to visitation, this challenge may not
actually jeopardize reunification.94 The legal-interest advocate's first task
is, therefore, to seek out solutions that would allow for the exercise of all
seemingly conflicting rights and, if one such solution exists, to advocate
for that path.
If the advocate determines that the case is at an impasse and a choice
must be made between two conflicting legal rights, unlike a best-interest
or client-directed advocate, the legal-interest attorney is not in the position
to make that choice. Without a client to give direction and authorize the
waiver of one legal right in favor of another, the only option is to present
an analysis of both legal rights to an impartial decision maker who can
make the ultimate determination.95 Consider how this situation plays out
in Austin's case.
E. Austin
Austin is a developmentally on-track two-year-old who was removed
from his parents at birth due to his testing positive for methamphetamine.
Austin is biracial and has been placed with his white grandparents, who are
93. Scholars have also pointed to this issue of conflicting legal rights as a significant
challenge of the legal-interest model. See, e.g., id. at 448-49. Mandelbaum, supra note 21, at
49-50 ("Clearly, there is confusion over what constitutes a child's legal interests and rights at an
adjudicatory hearing, or, if multiple rights are identified, how the differing interests should be
'prioritized' or resolved if in conflict.").
94. Because we are assuming that legal-interest advocacy would only ever be used when
a client is unable to articulate a position, the tendency to refrain from placing children with
caregivers who are likely to speak negatively about the parents will likely not have the same
impact on a baby, who cannot fully understand those negative words, as it would for an older,
verbal child.
95. Professor Guggenheim expands upon this directive to present issues to the court. He
believes a legal-interest attorney should also be careful to ensure that choices are presented
to the judicial officer in the way most likely to achieve a just result-by ensuring that both
sides of the issue are adequately represented. See, e.g., Guggenheim, supra note 37, at 1431-32
("Lawyers for children should help level the playing field. When they perceive an inadequate
or overworked prosecution office, it will be important for children's lawyers to ensure that all
available facts supporting the agency's case be placed before the judge .... Similarly, when the
child's lawyer perceives the parent's attorney as inadequate or overworked, it is important for
the lawyer to ensure that all facts supporting the parents be presented to the court."). Because
this approach requires the attorney to indulge his or her subjective view of whether an issue has
been fairly presented, these authors do not adopt this approach, as it seems to open the door to
an attorney favoring one right over another when the client is unable to provide direction.
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currently not interested in adopting Austin but are willing to be a permanent
placement for him through either long-term foster care or guardianship.
Austin has been placed with his grandparents since birth, but his biological
parents' rights have not yet been terminated. Austin's current permanent
plan is guardianship in accordance with his grandparents' preference. No
guardianship petition has been filed.
The state is now interested in moving Austin to a nonrelative, foster-to-
adopt placement so that Austin can find permanence in adoption. Austin
is very bonded to his grandparents and has never met the potential new
caregivers. However, the potential caregivers have adopted Austin's half
sibling, Jordan. Austin has not seen Jordan since he was a baby. The
potential placement caregivers are African American.
1. BEST-INTEREST REPRESENTATION
The best-interest attorney should meet with Austin in his placement and
meet with his grandparents; he or she should also meet with the potential
new foster caregivers' in their home. The eventual line of advocacy the
best-interest advocate will choose is hard to predict and will likely vary
based on the instincts and values of the individual advocate. If Austin is
doing well in his current placement and seems bonded to his grandparents,
the best-interest advocate might promote his continued placement in that
home. However, if the advocate is not pleased with the quality of care
Austin receives and thinks that Jordan seems to be doing well in the foster-
to-adopt home, the advocate might encourage a transition to an adoptive
home.
The best-interest advocate might also be influenced by the racial
dynamics in this case. This influence may be implicit and unacknowledged
by the advocate. It might be direct and deliberate. The advocate might
believe strongly that Austin will need the help of a caregiver of color to
assist him as he navigates his own racial identity, or the advocate might
believe that the grandmother's privilege better positions her to care for
Austin.
Austin's situation demonstrates the unpredictability that is associated
with best-interest advocacy.
2. LEGAL-INTEREST REPRESENTATION
Under federal law, Austin has the right to:
* preference for a relative placement; 96
* preference for placement with siblings, and, if that is not possible, to
visitation with siblings; 97
96. See 42 U.S.C § 671(a)(19) (2012).
97. See id. § 671(a)(31)(A)-(B).
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* a prohibition against considering race in placement decisions;98
* no distinction in preference between permanent plans; 99
* placement consistent with a primary plan and timely completion of
steps to finalize that plan;` and
* a transition to adoption, through the filing of a TPR petition, once the
child has been in out-of-home care for fifteen of the last twenty-two
months, unless the child is placed with a relative. 01
Austin's legal rights to relative placement and sibling placement seem
to conflict. Whenever rights conflict, the legal-interest attorney must
present information on both options to the judicial officer without taking
a position. However, the legal-interest attorney must also determine
whether or not the legal rights at issue actually do conflict. Austin's right
to continued sibling relationships does not necessarily conflict with his
right to permanence, and a legal-interest attorney should investigate the
possibility of sibling visitation so that Austin can develop a relationship
with Jordan. After assessing the possibility of visitation, the legal-interest
attorney should bring a motion on placement before the court and present
all relevant information to the judicial officer, ensuring meaningful
deliberation before Austin is removed from his grandparent's care.
Regardless of how the visitation investigation proceeds, the issue will
need to be brought before ajudicial officer. In the hearing, the legal-interest
attorney should note for the judicial officer the statutory preference for
placement with siblings and that the state is advocating and presenting
evidence in support of that placement. Austin also has a right to placement
consistent with his primary plan and a timely completion of that plan.
Austin's primary plan is guardianship, which does not require a TPR.
Further, the permanent plan of adoption is not granted any preference
over the permanent plan of guardianship. Adjusting the permanent plan to
adoption, seeking and obtaining a termination, and transition and approval
of the new adoptive home would all work against Austin's right to timely
permanence through his permanent plan.
The racial dynamics of this case must be confronted directly by the
legal-interest attorney, both in the context of his or her own advocacy and
in the actions of others. It would be naYve to assume that the mere existence
of the statute will eliminate the legal-interest attorney's implicit or explicit
biases, especially in a case in which the child's interest in permanence could
converge with implicitly or explicitly racist assumptions. 102 Nonetheless,
98. See id. §671(a)(18).
99. See id. § 675(5)(C).
100. See id. § 671(a)(15)(C).
101. See id. § 675(5).
102. Similarly, we should not assume all statutes are written to best protect against racist
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by prohibiting a consideration of race, the statute places a burden on the
advocate to be vigilant with respect to not only his or her own attitudes but
also to the attitudes and motivations of the remaining parties.
Ultimately, the judge will be tasked with determining the best outcome
for Austin. The legal-interest attorney is ensuring that the state is held to
its obligations to Austin and that any determination of what is best for
Austin is made after careful and open consideration with the possibility of
appellate review.
The limitations on an attorney to only advocate on behalf of clearly
delineated and specified legal rights and to interpret unclear terminology
to protect the enumerated right will be frustrating to many, as it is a
departure from the normal course of attorney practice and a restriction on
the tools the lawyer has available.' 03 However, it is essential to limit the
power of a preverbal child's attorney in order to ensure that the attorney
is not empowered to subvert the will of his or her client by inserting the
attorney's own will into the equation.
Most preverbal children will not remain preverbal forever and will, in
a few short years, be able to articulate a considered position that would
allow for more creative advocacy. Any legal model that substitutes the
lawyer's will for the client's before the client is able to express his or her
will undermines the client's later ability to act as an autonomous agent.
IV. A Critical Examination of Legal-Interest Advocacy
Although the legal-interest model addresses many of the criticisms
leveled at best-interest advocacy, it, too, is likely to generate criticism.
When advocates first discussed the legal-interest model in the 1990s,
scholars opined that the role, as then characterized, would fail as both too
limited to be useful and too susceptible to abuse by individual attorneys.
In addition to confronting these critiques, we must ensure that the legal-
interest model actually addresses the problems set out to be addressed and
actions. For example, the Interethnic Adoption Provisions of 1996, which amends the Multiethnic
Placement Act of 1994, expressly prohibits the use of race in determining adoptive placements
and was passed despite high controversy and the opposition of the National Association of Black
Social Workers. Id. § 1996b; Position Statement, Nat'l Ass'n of Black Soc. Workers, Transracial
Adoptions (Sept. 1972). The impact of this Act on the well-being of children of color continues
to be debated. See, e.g., David J. Herring, The Multiethnic Placement Act: Threat to Foster
Child Safety and Well-Being?, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 89, 89 (2007); Cynthia R. Mabry,
A MEPA-IEP Review from Adoption Attorneys'Perspectives: Continuing to Make Permissible
Assessments Based on Race for the Best Interests of Children of Color, 38 CAP. U. L. REv. 319,
319 (2009).
103. See, e.g., Appell, supra note 60, at 1963 ("[T]his model could limit constitutional
challenges to, or defenses in, proceedings in which the applicable substantive state or federal
law may be unconstitutional.").
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withstands the criticism leveled against best-interest advocacy. Part IV
of this article attempts to explore and respond to each of these potential
criticisms of legal-interest advocacy to demonstrate the value of this model
moving forward.
A. Is Legal-Interest Advocacy Really Any Different than
Best-Interest Advocacy?
For those staunchly opposed to the appointment of best-interest
attorneys for small children, it may be hard to accept the notion that the
legal-interest model will really be any different. Scholars have previously
lamented that the legal-interest model would still allow best-interest
notions to dominate.104 There is legitimate concern that the legal-interest
model will continue to perpetuate the failures of best-interest advocacy
while providing the cover of legitimacy, cloaking attorney biases in the
language of legal rights so that these same biases now appear to have the
authority of law.
However, the strict legal-interest model proposed here is self-conscious
in its restraint. It takes to heart one of the most central tenets of the
lawyer's role, which is that it is inappropriate for lawyers to substitute
their own judgment for that of their clients."o' Under this model, we know
that legal-interest attorneys will be confined to championing only those
outcomes that are protected by specific rights. Legal-interest attorneys do
not have the authority to assert their will, and their power is constrained
to those specific rights enumerated in statute or clearly delineated in case
law. The legal-interest attorney is confined to this set list of enumerated
rights, and any interpretation of unspecific phrasing must be limited to the
interpretation that most protects a child's specified statutory right. In this
way, legal-interest advocacy is formulaic and without flexibility to fit the
biases of an individual attorney.1 0 6
104. See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 17, at 97 ("[L]imiting a lawyer's function to investigation
and presentation of evidence is unlikely to accomplish the desired result of eliminating all
subjective advocacy by lawyers for 'impaired' children ... . A lawyer's decision-making about
which facts to bring to the court's attention and which facts to deemphasize will inevitably involve
preliminary judgments about the merits of the case . ... One cannot evaluate the importance
of evidence without asking, For what purpose?"); Emily Buss, Confronting Developmental
Barriers to the Empowerment of Child Clients, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 895, 961 (1999) ("[T]here
is no neutral position that a lawyer (indeed, anyone who engages in a relationship with a child)
can take. Every approach will send some message, however subtle, to the child."); Mandelbaum,
supra note 21, at 52 ("By the very nature of what the attorney chooses to call to the judge's
attention, the attorney is likely emphasizing a particular point of view.").
105. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2015) ("[A] lawyer shall abide
by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4,
shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued.").
106. Some of those same scholars who criticize the attorneys for implicit bias in their
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It may be tempting to get distracted by the appearance of the term "best
interest" written into statutes regarding the rights of children. There are
various examples of a child being granted a legal right so long as it is
within his or her best interest; one would be a child's rights regarding
placement that includes the right to "placement in a safe setting that is
the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting
available and in close proximity to the parents' home, consistent with the
best interest and special needs of the child."'0 7 Just as an attorney is not
qualified to make the ultimate best-interest determination, an attorney is
not qualified to assess when it may be in children's best interest to be
granted an exception to explicitly stated legal rights. When best interest is
included in the statute, typically it is included either in a list of factors to
be considered by the judicial officer or as the grounds for an exception to
a specified legal right.' Because an attorney is not qualified to determine
the child's best interest and the determination of a child's best interest falls
outside of the scope of the representation, a legal-interest advocate should
never champion the best-interest exception to a legal right granted to the
child or rely on best-interest factors in advocating a specific outcome.
Instead, vague terms must be interpreted in the light most protective of
the underlying legal right. Therefore, any application of the best-interest
exception should only be advocated by the state or the parent or, as always,
initiated by the judicial officer sua sponte.
representation point to the need to reduce discretion and increase reliance on objective criteria,
which is the goal of legal-interest advocacy. See, e.g., Duquette, supra note 32, at 1242-43
("[T]he ABA Standards, the NACC modification of these standards and the Fordham
Conference Recommendations all contain within themselves opportunity for lawyer discretion
about what position to take on behalf of the child that is unreviewed by anyone else, not
guided by principled criteria, and potentially idiosyncratic."); Haralambie, supra note 20, at
178 ("[E]ven in a substituted judgment model, there is now consensus that the attorney should
be guided by objective criteria, not merely the attorney's subjective views and experiences.");
Mandelbaum, supra note 21, at 63 ("The solution lies in our ongoing attempts to answer the
question of how lawyers for young children can provide principled and unbiased representation
to young children. Any model that is developed must give sufficient guidance and direction so
that the representation is less arbitrary, less biased, and hopefully true to the children's lived
experiences.").
107. 42 U.S.C.A. § 675(5)(a) (West 2010).
108. The reason for this limited scope of the best-interest standard is constitutional. The
U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Troxel v. Granville that there are limitations on a state's power to
intervene in a family and that consideration of the child's best interest alone is not sufficient to
interfere with the rights of parents. 530 U.S. 57, 66-67 (2000) ("[T]he Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning
the care, custody, and control of their children.").
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B. Is Legal-Interest Advocacy Too Limited to
Provide Meaningful Value?
On the other side of the spectrum, attorneys who are accustomed to
best-interest advocacy will likely decry any infringement on their use of
discretion as a grave threat to the rights of children. Many will likely claim
that best-interest representation is necessary to ensure that children are
protected at a time when they are most vulnerable and a time that is critical
to their emotional and intellectual development.1 09 Supporting these fears
are scholars who have previously dismissed legal-interest advocacy as
mere issue spotting and who have remarked that the role of the legal-
interest advocate is too minimal to be useful in complex dependency
proceedings."o
Very young children caught in the child welfare system are at a critical
time in their emotional and mental development, and their inability to
verbalize their needs makes them particularly vulnerable. However, these
truths do not necessitate the granting of the extreme power that is currently
bestowed on best-interest attorneys who are unqualified to intervene in the
child's family in an attempt to divine what is best for any individual child.
By removing this ultimate power from the attorney and placing it with
the judge, we create a situation in which all parties are able to raise any
concerns on equal footing and no party is empowered to present his or her
personal opinion as the ultimate authority.
As outlined in Part III of this article, the legal-interest model envisioned
is more than mere issue spotting and a neutral presentation to a judicial
officer. A legal-interest attorney is tasked with identifying legal rights and
then fully advocating for their enforcement. Just as with any attorney, a
simple understanding of the abstract legal rights is not sufficient. A legal-
interest attorney must analyze the individual facts of each case to assess
which grants of legal rights are applicable to each child and then zealously
pursue those rights. This advocacy may include negotiations with parties
out of court to ensure that legal requirements are being met and also court
109. See, e.g., P. Litzelfelner & C. Petr, Child Advocacy in Child Welfare, 42 Soc. WORK
392, 394 (1997) ("Children who have been abused or neglected represent a uniquely vulnerable
population in need of case advocates. By definition, children are in need of adult spokespersons
to look out for their best interests.").
110. See, e.g., Duquette, supra note 32, at 1241-42 (2006) ("[T]he lawyer could merely take
no position at all, but simply be sure the court is fully informed on the important issues. This
seems of limited use to the court and overlooks the fact that in nearly all cases, parties come
to court with agreements on various issues. The position-less child advocate will have little to
contribute to a negotiated settlement if he or she takes no position on the litigation."); Katherine
Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing
and Counseling the Child Client, 64 FRDHAM L. REv. 1655, 1694 (1996) ("The lawyer has
obligations to the client stemming from the client's legal rights and interests. Thus, if the client
has no legal right, the lawyer would appear to owe nothing to the client.").
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motions to ensure that, for example, screenings and services, including
mental health services, are provided; sibling visitation occurs; reunification
is actively pursued; and relative placements are sought and vetted.
Only when legal rights conflict is an attorney for the child forced to
identify the conflict and present it in a neutral way to a judicial officer.
This is bound to happen from time to time, but, in the context and limited
scope of a legal-rights approach, its frequency should be relatively limited.
When an attorney is limited to this information-presenter role, his or her
work will continue to provide value to the proceedings. An attorney's role
is to sort through the myriad facts in a case and to identify and present
the facts that are relevant to the question at issue. Attorneys can also
retain expert witnesses to provide a greater understanding of the child's
circumstances when the record is lacking that information.
The provision of a judge who is trained in the law will not sufficiently
ensure that the legal rights of the child are identified at every stage. A
judicial officer is experienced, not with identifying all relevant legal issues
in play, but in responding to the legal issues raised by the parties. A child,
like a parent and the state, needs an attorney to properly bring the issues
to the judicial officer's attention. Although a neutral fact-presenter may
appear to be less protective of the child than a zealous advocate, there
remains value in ensuring that the rights of the child are considered and
addressed on the record at every stage.
Without the attorney's presence, it is likely that the rights of children
will be overshadowed and overlooked by the adults in the proceeding who
are focused on the adversarial nature of the overarching conflict between
removal and reunification. We only need to look to the various child-
welfare class action lawsuits for confirmation of the reality that children's
legal rights are all too often ignored in mandatory review hearings
established to ensure court oversight. For example, the Southern District
of Texas recently found that the Texas child welfare system caused an
unreasonable risk of harm to a class of foster children, specifically finding
that allegations of abuse by the child only received cursory reviews or were
not investigated at all, that the state failed to follow court orders to return
children to their families, and that children were appointed many different
caseworkers during their time in care, with some children never meeting
their caseworkers.' One of the ordered remedies in this case was the
appointment of an attorney to all children in the class of child litigants.112
These stories of children's rights being ignored are all too common in state
systems where children are left without legal representation. The presence
111. M.D. v. Abbott, 152 F. Supp. 3d 684, 745-47 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
112. Id. at 826.
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of an attorney whose sole function is to protect the child's legal rights will
ensure that courts and parties remain child-centered and will only improve
on those outcomes.
C. Does Legal-Interest Advocacy Withstand the Critiques
Aimed at Best-Interest Advocacy?
Before the legal community can gather behind the concept of legal-
interest advocacy, we must ensure that it addresses the problems associated
with the best-interest model, and, therefore, is, in reality, an improvement
on our current system. As discussed in Part II, best-interest advocacy
has been criticized for allowing implicit biases, lack of accountability,
inconsistent application, and assumption of nonexistent expertise in an
attorney; serving state prosecutorial functions; disrupting appropriate
power balances; and violating the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
As discussed below, the legal-interest model addresses each of these
criticisms.
1. DOMINATION OF IMPLICIT BIASES
The best-interest model has been criticized for allowing an advocate's
implicit biases to dominate his or her representation.1 13 The legal-interest
model does not allow for the domination of implicit biases by the attorney
because it removes the ability of the attorney to choose between competing
directions of the case. Under a legal-interest framework, determinations
about what is best for a child will not be made by an unaccountable attorney
who is likely to have a different set of assumptions and understandings
about the world than the child and the child's family. Instead, these
determinations will be left to judges, who are also likely to have a different
set of assumptions and understanding about the world than the child and
the child's family." 4
113. See supra discussion accompanying note 21.
114. It cannot be ignored that the child welfare system is subject to criticism as an extension
of a long history of state power leveled against families of color and that children of color in
foster care suffer heightened risk of abuse within the child welfare system itself. See, e.g., Tanya
Asim Cooper, Racial Bias in American Foster Care: The National Debate, 97 MARQ. L. REv.
215, 218-19 (2013) ("Once in foster care, however, children face heightened risk for abuse and
neglect within the system itself and generally suffer poorer outcomes and prospects, as studies and
current events repeatedly demonstrate. What this means, therefore, is that African American and
Native American children, especially those who are poor, are disproportionately more likely to
enter foster care, where they are at high risk of secondary harm by the system itself."); Stephanie
Smith Ledesma, The Vanishing of the African-American Family: "Reasonable Efforts" and Its
Connection to the Disproportionality of the Child Welfare System, 9 CHARLESTON L. REv. 29, 32
(2014) ("This latitude given to each state to define what is and what is not a reasonable effort,
coupled with the internal biases created and supported by the master narrative, means that what
constitutes reasonable efforts may vary greatly from one tribunal to the next. The result has led
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The intrusion of implicit bias cannot be completely eliminated from
our judicial system through an implementation of the legal-interest model.
However, by moving the determination of the ultimate questions at
issue to the purview of the judge, the parties have the ability to increase
accountability through open hearings and the appellate process. When the
best-interest attorney is acting on his or her implicit biases in making the
determination as to what is best, that decision is made entirely within the
confines of the attorney's head, and we are unable to see and assess the
validity of that determination.
Of course, biases on the part of the legal-interest attorney could surface
in the attorney's presentation of facts and legal analysis to the court.11 s
However, because these decisions and discussions will be made in an open
courtroom, instead of within the advocate's own head, other parties and
counsel will be able to see and assess the facts presented and raise any
concerns about potential bias before the court's ultimate determination is
made.
Neither the open hearing nor the appellate process is available as an
accountability measure when a party believes that the child's attorney is
making determinations based on implicit bias. Additionally, as described
above, these opportunities for an attorney's biases to have any impact in
the proceedings are limited to instances where conflicts between clearly
delineated rights emerge.
By limiting the discretion of the attorney and ensuring that all key
decisions are made in an open forum with accountability through the
appellate process, implicit biases will be less likely to dominate the
proceedings than when decisions are made in private by the advocates
themselves.
our nation to a child welfare system that is rampant with racial and ethnic disproportionality,
thereby resulting in generations of children who find themselves in need of protection from child
protective service agencies."); Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 2003 U. ILL.
L. REV. 171, 180-81 (2003) ("[D]isproportionate state intervention in black families reinforces
the continued political subordination of blacks as a group. This claim does not seek to enforce
a particular set of black cultural values. It seeks to liberate black families from state control so
they may be free to form and pass on their own values. This, after all, is the role of families in a
free society.").
115. See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 17, at 97 ("[A] lawyer's decision-making about which
facts to bring to the court's attention and which facts to deemphasize will inevitably involve
preliminary judgments about the merits of the case .... One cannot evaluate the importance of
evidence without asking, 'For what purpose?'); Buss, supra note 104, at 961 ("[T]here is no
neutral position that a lawyer (indeed, anyone who engages in a relationship with a child) can
take. Every approach will send some message, however subtle, to the child [and other parties
for that matter]."); Mandelbaum, supra note 21, at 52 ("By the very nature of what the attorney
chooses to call to the judge's attention, the attorney is likely emphasizing a particular point of
view.").
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2. LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY
A related concern is the lack of accountability of individual best-
interest attorneys. 1 16 A legal-interest attorney is more accountable than a
best-interest attorney because the legal-interest attorney is not authorized
to make determinations between competing legal rights and is instead
required to air any such conflicts in open court. There is always the
possibility that the legal-interest attorney will act unethically and advocate
outside of his or her authority for one legal right over another. However,
this unethical behavior can be identified by the parents' attorneys and
judicial officers who are also trained in the law.
By limiting the advocacy of a preverbal child's attorney to specific
rights, parents' attorneys, judicial officers, and states' attorneys are
also provided a basis to challenge the child's attorney, whenever there
is doubt as to the attorney's true motivations. By tying the advocacy to
specifically enumerated rights, an attorney must be able to defend that line
of advocacy through the statute, whereas a best-interest attorney need not
point to anything outside of his or her own instincts to defend the logic.
By ensuring that the principles guiding the representation are not vague
notions of child development and needs, but, rather, are to be found in
statutes known to all parties, all parties are better able to protect against
unethical insertions of an attorney's will.
3. INCONSISTENCY
A critical difference between the legal-interest and best-interest models
is predictability. While the best-interest advocate is permitted to indulge
his or her gut instinct, the legal-interest advocate is constrained by the law.
Given the same case, two best-interest advocates may advocate for very
different positions.'" The fact that sometimes the best-interest advocate
would advocate for the same outcome as a legal-interest advocate is mere
happenstance. By providing restrictions and limitations on the discretion
of the attorney, the legal-interest model does not fall victim to the
unpredictability of the best-interest model.
Legal-interest advocacy should be consistent within each state, as an
application of the statutes to a case should not vary from one attorney
to the next. It may be impossible to reach a place of true uniformity and
objectivity. However, restricting advocates to a defined and specific list of
rights to be protected will get us closer to the mark."'
116. See supra discussion accompanying note 23.
117. See supra discussion accompanying note 22.
118. Professor Guggenheim believes that uniformity of behaviors should be one of the two
primary goals for child advocates. See Guggenheim, supra note 37, at 1414-15 ("Law should
strive to achieve two goals in creating rules for child advocacy. The first is to ensure uniformity
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4. ASSUMPTION OF NONEXISTENT EXPERTISE
Best-interest advocacy calls upon a lawyer to determine the best course
of action for each particular child. To make this ultimate determination,
a judge must take into account the advice of the social worker, child
development experts, mental health therapists, the child's parents, and
the judge's own experience with child welfare systems. Assigning this
determination to a child's attorney assumes his or her expertise in child
welfare systems, mental health, child development, and social work.1 19
Alternatively, legal-interest advocacy relies only on skills that are inherent
to the legal profession that all lawyers are trained to practice: legal analysis,
issue spotting, and the use of court processes to ensure systems remain
accountable. Instead of assuming a child's attorney can and should be an
expert in all of the professional disciplines operating within child welfare,
the legal-interest model sets the more realistic and practical expectation:
that attorneys be experts in the law. The legal-interest model allows for the
retainer of true experts in mental health, child development, social work,
and other relevant fields, to provide a second opinion when a child's legal
rights are at stake. This model reserves any reliance on opinions to those
opinions offered by professionals with relevant expertise.
5. SERVICE OF STATE PROSECUTORIAL FUNCTIONS
According to best-interest critics, best-interest advocates often err on
the side of removal and nearly always align with the state.120 As such,
they are said to serve state prosecutorial functions. Alternatively, the
legal-interest model will serve state prosecutorial functions to the degree
that state statutes serve prosecutorial functions, but no more. While an
attorney may argue for termination of parental rights in situations where
the statute grants specific exceptions to reasonable efforts for reunification
standardsl21 or after timelines for reunifications have passed, 12 2 this service
of prosecutorial functions is mandated by statutes that are transparent and
revisable through the legislative process. To the extent that attorneys,
of behaviors .... The second goal is to maximize the probability of advancement of a child's
legal rights."). Professor Duquette similarly focuses on objectivity. See Duquette, supra note 90,
at 454 ("[O]bjectivity in determining the interests of the child where the child is too young or
too immature to provide direction is the lawyer's ideal.").
119. See, e.g., Fordham Recommendations, supra note 30 ("Lawyers should approach
decision making on behalf of their clients with extreme caution. Nothing about legal training or
traditional legal roles qualifies lawyers to make decisions on behalf of their clients.").
120. See supra discussion accompanying note 26.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii) (2012) (explaining that reasonable efforts towards
reunification are not required when, for example, the parent has been found to have murdered
another of his or her children).
122. Id. § 675(5)(E).
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parents, and child welfare officials are uncomfortable relying on state
statutes, their energies would be better spent supporting legislative change
instead of expecting the child's advocate to disregard or subvert the statute.
6. DISRUPTION OF APPROPRIATE POWER BALANCES
Best-interest advocacy has also been criticized for disrupting appropriate
power balances by assigning the ultimate legal question-the course of
action that is in the child's best interest-to an attorney instead of the
judicial officer.123 The appropriate power balance between the judicial
officer and the child's advocate remains in place with the legal-interest
model. Under the best-interest model, the child's advocate is often charged
with making the ultimate determination in the proceeding: what course of
action is in the child's best interest. The legal-interest model removes this
determination from the attorney's purview and returns it to the judicial
officer, who has the authority to make such determinations. By doing so,
all of the attorneys in the proceeding are empowered and encouraged to
fulfill their advocacy roles to bring evidence and issues before the court so
that the judge can make an informed best-interest decision.
Some may argue that the very existence of an attorney representing
any child's legal interests wrests power from the parent, who should be
in control of decision making for the child.'2 4 However, this wresting of
control from the parent is limited to situations where the state has already
intervened in the family unit to disrupt the parent-child power balance.
Once the state intervenes to override the will of the parent, the power
balance is not what it once was, and the child now must also confront the
power of the state in his or her life. Because legal-interest attorneys are not
weighing in on the parent's day-to-day opinions about what is best, but are
instead limiting their actions to protect the child's legal rights, the power
imbalance in the parent-child relationship is kept to a minimum.
7. VIOLATIONS OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Finally, some have argued that the best-interest model violates the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. No matter which approach an
attorney chooses, the Model Rules do not spell out the ideal approach to
representing preverbal clients.12 5 However, the legal-interest model is more
123. See supra discussion accompanying note 25.
124. See supra discussion accompanying note 24.
125. See, e.g., MODEL RULES PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.14 cmt. 7 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2015) ("If a
legal representative has not been appointed, the lawyer should consider whether appointment
of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian is necessary to protect the client's interests.
[. . .] In addition, rules of procedure in litigation sometimes provide that minors or persons
with diminished capacity must be represented by a guardian or next friend if they do not have a
general guardian. In many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative may
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consistent with a lawyer's professional duties than the best-interest model.
The Model Rules instruct attorneys to follow their client's direction12 6
and to treat a client with diminished capacity as much like a client with
full capacity as possible.1 27 By inserting the will of the lawyer into the
equation, the best-interest lawyer is certainly departing from the normal
attorney-client relationship.
Model Rule 1.14 allows an attorney to take protective action when "the
lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at
risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken
and cannot adequately act in the client's own interest."1 28 According to
the Model Rules, protective action can only occur when the client both
has diminished capacity and is at risk of substantial harm unless action is
taken. Despite this clear direction, the best-interest advocate presumes to
take protective action at every stage of his or her representation without
a preliminary showing of harm. Alternatively, a legal-interest attorney is
only allowed to act to protect the child's explicitly enumerated legal rights.
Explained in the inverse, legal-interest representation is only active when
a child is at risk of having a legal right violated. This kind of violation is
certainly a harm that can be interpreted to authorize the use of protective
action by the child's attorney.
The ABA Comment on Rule 1.14 lists potential protective measures
that an attorney might pursue, including "consulting with family members,
using a reconsideration period to permit clarification or improvement of
circumstances, using voluntary surrogate decision-making tools such as
durable powers of attorney or consulting with support groups, professional
services, adult-protective agencies or other individuals or entities that
have the ability to protect the client."1 29 Neither insertion of the attorney's
own will nor a legal-interest framework is included in this list of potential
protective measures. However, the list is not presented as an exclusive
one. Best-interest advocates actively subvert the normal client-lawyer
relationship by allowing the opposite of client-directed representation:
lawyer-directed representation and the insertion of the lawyer's will over
be more expensive or traumatic for the client than circumstances in fact require. Evaluation
of such circumstances is a matter entrusted to the professional judgment of the lawyer. In
considering alternatives, however, the lawyer should be aware of any law that requires the
lawyer to advocate the least restrictive action on behalf of the client.").
126. Id r. 1.2(a).
127. Id. r. 1.14(a) ("When a client's capacity to make adequately considered decisions in
connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment
or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal
client-lawyer relationship with the client.").
128. Id. r.1.14.
129. Id r. 1.14, cmt. 5.
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the client. The Model Rules allow the appointment of a guardian ad litem
to direct the attorney's representation, but they do not consider allowing
the attorneys themselves to act as guardians ad litem and provide their own
direction to the representation.
The Comment goes on to say that protective measures should be
governed by "such factors as the wishes and values of the client to the
extent known, the client's best interests and the goals of intruding into
the client's decision-making autonomy to the least extent feasible,
maximizing client capacities and respecting the client's family and social
connections.""o Legal-interest representation clearly fits within the goal of
intruding "to the least extent feasible" by providing minimal advocacy that
is limited exclusively to defined, specified, and nonconflicting legal rights.
Further, the model encourages the use of client-directed representation as
soon as the client is able to articulate a position, reserving for another
day the opportunity for the client to decide what is in his or her own best
interest, thereby maximizing the client's capacity. Although no form of
direct representation for preverbal child clients may fit perfectly under the
Model Rules, it appears that legal-interest advocacy much more closely
aligns with the spirit of the Rules than does best-interest advocacy.
Legal-interest advocacy allows for protection of a child's legal rights
and ensures accountability of the state to the needs of the child. There is no
guarantee that a legal-interest attorney will ensure that the best outcome is
achieved for every child client, but the difficult job of determining what is
best is not for the attorney to do. By limiting the discretion of an attorney
and increasing transparency, we can help ensure that legal representation
does not result in the imposition of an individual attorney's values,
implicit biases, and inexpert opinions. We can also ensure that the judge
is reminded at every turn of the rights of the child within the proceedings.
V. Conclusion
Over the last fifty years, attorneys have struggled with how to represent
very young children. The need for legal representation continues to grow
as the statutory system surrounding the child welfare system becomes
more and more complex and children removed from their homes become
younger and younger. Even without a federal mandate, a growing number
of states are requiring that children have lawyers to help them navigate
their state-regulated childhoods. At the federal level, as CAPTA moves
toward reauthorization, the pressure is likely to build again for amendments
requiring all states to provide counsel for children in the child welfare
system.
130. Id.
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With all of these forces coalescing towards requiring that the youngest
children have lawyers to represent their legal rights, it is critical to
determine the appropriate role for attorneys representing preverbal clients.
The time has come for the legal-interest advocacy model to be revived
as the ethical alternative to the best-interest and substituted-judgment
advocacy models for preverbal children.
Appendix: Federal Legal Rights of Children in Dependencies
All citations to the U.S. Code in this Appendix
are to the 2012 edition.
Before Removal
* Policies and procedures for referrals to services for infants born drug
affected and a plan for safe care. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii).
* Confidentiality of all records. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(viii).
* Ability to authorize medical treatment through the courts. 42 U.S.C.§ 5106a(b)(2)(C)(iii).
At Initial Removal
* Reasonable efforts to preserve the family before placement to prevent
the need to remove the child. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(i).
* If a child qualifies as an Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1912, additional rights apply:
o unless an emergency exists, deferral of a foster care placement
hearing until tribe has had ample time to review;
o active efforts to provide remedial services to prevent breakup of
the Indian family, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d);
o Expert testimony to prove removal needed, 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e).
At Hearing to Maintain Removal/Substantiation
* Referral to IDEA early intervention services if under age three once
substantiated abuse or neglect. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xxi).
* Within thirty days of removal, department must have made diligent
efforts to identify and notify all adult grandparents, siblings, and
relatives about the child's removal and process for involvement and
placement. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(29).
While in State's Care
* Reasonable efforts by the state to reunify the child's family, 42 U.S.C.
§ 671(a)(15)(B), except that a child, the state, or other parent may
resist this requirement if:
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o aggravating circumstances exist (sex abuse, parent committed
murder, or parent has lost rights to a sibling), 42 U.S.C § 671(a)
(1 5)(D)(ii)-(iii);
o a parent is a registered sex offender. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(2)(B)(xv).
* Least-restrictive placement available, in close proximity to parent's
home (unless case plan sets out why it is not in the child's best interest).
42 U.S.C. § 675(5).
* Regular visits by a social worker:
o if a child is placed out of state, in-person visit by this state's social
worker at least once every six months, 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(A)(ii);
o visits by case worker approximately monthly (state required to
hit this target in ninety-five percent of cases), 42 U.S.C. § 624(f)
(1)(A);
o visits by caseworker at the child's placement at least six times a
year, 42 U.S.C. § 624(f)(2)(A);
* Coordinated health care, including regular screenings, oversight
of prescriptions, continuity of health care, and treatment of trauma
associated with removal. 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(15).
* Updated health and education records provided to placement at the
time of placement. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(D).
* Receipt of an education, though homeschooling is acceptable as
allowed under state law. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(30).
* Placement in a home or facility that meets state standards for sanitation,
safety, and protection of civil rights. 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(10)(A).
o If placed in an institution, child is to have one caregiver designated
to apply the prudent parent standard to allow the child's
participation in age or developmentally appropriate activities.
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(10)(D).
o Nonsafety-related waivers allowed for relative placements.
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(10)(D).
o Criminal background check for prospective placements. 42 U.S.C.
§ 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xxii).
o If placed with foster parents, child is to be placed with foster
parents who have been trained on prudent parent standard.
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(24).
* State consideration of a placement preference for relatives over
nonrelated caregivers. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(19).
* Reasonable efforts by the state to place with siblings or at least provide
frequent visitation or ongoing interaction unless it is documented that
it is contrary to the safety or well-being of siblings. 42 U.S.C. § 67 1(a)
(31).
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Siblings include former siblings whose legal relationship was
extinguished through a termination of parental rights. 42 U.S.C.
§ 675(12).
* Race not to be used as a factor in placement or adoption decisions.
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(18).
* A permanency planning hearing no less than every twelve months
after entering foster care. Per 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C), the hearing shall:
o determine a permanent plan of reunification, adoption, legal
guardianship, or another planned permanent living arrangement
(APPLA), such as long-term foster care;
o determine a timeline for achieving the permanent plan;
o not have "long-term foster care" or other APPLA plans listed as
the permanent plan until children are age sixteen or older unless
there is a compelling reason;.
o provide an analysis, for children fourteen and over, of the services
needed to transition from foster care to adulthood (relevant for
nonverbal/disabled youth: planning should not wait until age
17.5).
* Placement in a timely manner consistent with the primary plan and
completion of steps necessary to finalize that plan. 42 U.S.C. § 67 1(a)
(1 5)(C).
* Transition to adoption (through filing a Termination of Parental
Rights petition and identifying, recruiting, processing, and approving
a qualified family for adoption) if in foster care for fifteen of the most
recent twenty-two months, unless certain exceptions apply. 42 U.S.C.
§ 675(5)(E). Child is not to be forced into a:
o termination of parental rights if placed in a relative's care.
o termination of parental rights if the court has found that reasonable
efforts to reunify the family consistent with the case plan have not
been made by the state.
o termination of parental rights if the state has documented a
compelling reason it is not in the child's best interest.
* Review of the child's status at least every six months to determine
necessity and appropriateness of placement, compliance with case
plan, and progress. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(B). At the review:
o project a likely date by which the child may reach permanency;
o monitor the state's efforts to ensure the placement is acting as a
reasonable and prudent parent;
o ascertain whether the child has regular, ongoing opportunities to
engage in age or developmentally appropriate actives.
* If a child qualifies as an Indian child under ICWA, additional rights
apply:
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right to be placed within tribe if such placements are available.
25 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
At Termination of Parental Rights
If a child qualifies as an Indian child under ICWA, additional rights
apply:
o Right to maintain parent-child relationship unless there is
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that custody is likely to result
in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. 25 U.S.C.
§ 1912(f).
Post Adoption
* If a child qualifies as an Indian child under ICWA, additional rights
apply:
o Right to be notified of biological parents and tribal affiliation, if
requested. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1917.
